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Abstract: The negotiations of multilateral agreements are often long and laborious 
endeavors, but international relations scholars know very little about what occurs during 
the bargaining of such agreements, and systematic empirical work is seriously lacking.  
Little empirical work on how multilateral agreements are negotiated exists because data 
on the negotiations of a large number of agreements across multiple issue areas has not 
been collected.  The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new database of facts related 
to the multilateral agreement making process.  The dataset includes data on what 
occurred during the negotiations of 170 multilateral agreements, across several different 
issue areas.  Research design and case selection are discussed, as well as the coding of 
three variables unique to the dataset: the length of negotiations, the first proposal maker, 
and the number of negotiating states.  Descriptive statistics on these variables are also 
provided.   
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I. Introduction 
Many of the interactions among states are covered by multilateral agreements 
addressing problems that may arise.  States do not always address problems through 
multilateral agreements; it is a state’s choice whether or not to create, sign, and enter into 
formal commitments.  And at times states cooperate with one another in the absence of 
international agreements.  Yet multilateral agreements and treaties are formal 
arrangements established by states to codify this cooperation.  There are hundreds of 
multilateral agreements that have been negotiated and are currently in force.  These 
agreements cover issues all over the spectrum: from the protection of sea turtles to the 
treatment of prisoners of war, from the law of the sea to agreements covering the moon 
and outer space, from prohibiting weapons of mass destruction to promoting the 
consumption of cocoa, from international railways to the International Criminal Court.   
These are just a few examples of the vast number of issues that are dealt with by states 
through the use of multilateral agreements. 
Fifty years of the study of international cooperation has led to various theories 
concerning both the causes and effects of international institutions.  As Lisa Martin and 
Beth Simmons (1998) note: “institutions are simultaneously causes and effects; that is, 
institutions are both the objects of state choice and consequential” (743).  In addition to 
examining the effects international institutions may or may not have on state behavior, 
the literature has looked at the choices states make in choosing such institutions.  One 
such focus has been the “rational design” of these institutions (Mitchell 1994, 
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, Koremenos 2002 and 2005, Mitchell and Keilbach 
2001, Morrow 2001, Rosendorff and Milner 2001).  Recognizing the existence of a great 
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variety of international institutions, these scholars argue that differences in design “are 
the result of rational, purposive interactions among states and other international actors to 
solve specific problems” (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001, 762).  Here, based on 
potential distributional problems, enforcement problems, the number of states involved, 
and uncertainty, states negotiate over the membership rules, scope, centralization, 
control, and flexibility of the institutions they are designing because these choices affect 
outcomes.  Other major debates in the institutional design literature include whether a 
“broader-deeper tradeoff” exists.  For example, Downs, Rocke and Barsoom (1998) argue 
that large multilateral agreements that start out with a small number of states are able to 
achieve deeper levels of cooperation than agreements that start out with a large number of 
states.      
Beyond just institutional design, some scholars have begun to address the 
modeling of the bargaining that takes place during the negotiations of agreements.  While 
earlier applications of game theory, particularly the use of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, 
addressed enforcement problems (Stein 1982, Snidal 1985a, Oye 1986), others 
recognized that enforcement is not the sole issue facing states during the negotiation 
phase of cooperation.  Morrow (1994) looks at how distributional and informational 
problems make cooperation difficult; states may agree to cooperate, but because of 
distributional concerns, they may not be able to agree on how to cooperate.  Fearon 
(1998) splits international cooperation problems into two types: bargaining problems and 
enforcement problems.  States must bargain over a number of self-enforcing agreements 
that are preferable to no agreement, but they disagree over which of these self-enforcing 
agreements is preferred.  Using a war of attrition bargaining model, Fearon shows that the 
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agreements that are expected to be the most enforceable may be the most difficult to 
negotiate, as states have an incentive to bargain harder.  Gilligan (2004) applies a 
bargaining model to the multilateral agreement creation process. 
However, these theories, as well as other theories concerning international 
institutions, have yet to be tested in a systematic way.  Evidence found either in support 
of or against theoretical claims has often been anecdotal. Empirical work on how 
multilateral agreements are negotiated mostly consists of case study analysis of a few 
select agreements.  For example, the “rational design” literature looks at specific cases, 
whether Robert Pahre (2001) providing support with a look at 19th century trade, Ronald 
Mitchell and Patricia Keilbach’s (2001) focus on a handful of environmental issues or 
James Morrow’s (2001) evidence from prisoner of war treaties.  The existing bargaining 
models also have yet to be tested: Fearon (1998) discusses Cold War arms control, and 
Gilligan (2004) offers empirical implications yet to be tested.  And when empirical 
analysis has been more systematic, it has been limited to a single issue area, such as 
international monetary affairs (Simmons 2000) or environmental agreements (Downs et 
al 1998). 
The reason that little empirical work on how multilateral agreements are 
negotiated exists is that data on the negotiations of a large number of agreements across 
multiple issue areas has not been collected.  The negotiations of multilateral agreements 
are often long and laborious endeavors.  But we, as international relations scholars, 
actually know very little about what occurs during the bargaining of such agreements.  
Among the factors that little is known about are what countries propose and push for each 
agreement, who prepares the first draft proposal, how long negotiations take, how many 
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states are involved in negotiations, and what role non-state actors play in this process.  
While we know how some of the more famous agreements were created, we know very 
little about the process of creating multilateral agreements in general.  To really have an 
understanding of cooperation between states, more needs to be known about the process 
of creating these agreements.    
The goal of this project is to provide data on the process by which multilateral 
agreements are created in order to test hypotheses derived from theories of international 
cooperation and bargaining.  Such data and empirical testing will allow us to answer 
questions that have not been answered yet in a general way.  The systematic testing of 
hypotheses derived from a number of existing theories will allow those studying 
international cooperation to evaluate where existing theory has been deficient.  Such 
insights into the process of how states cooperate with each other will allow us to develop 
improved theories and models of international bargaining and cooperation.  Finally, this 
project will create a wealth of understanding of what actually occurs during multilateral 
negotiations.  There are clearly a number of different international agreement-making 
processes, and the data collected allows for the identification of a number of common 
patterns or processes of multilateral negotiations.   
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a dataset on international multilateral 
agreement negotiations.  In the following section I introduce the dataset, discussing the 
research design of the project, including both case selection and the data collection 
process.  Then in the following three sections, I describe the coding of the three variables 
unique to this project: the duration of negotiations, the first proposal maker, and the 
number of negotiating states.  Details of how each of these variables was coded and 
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descriptive statistics are provided.  The final section discusses the direction of continued 
research on this project.  
 
II. Research Design: Case Selection and Data Collection 
A single case is identified as a signed, multilateral agreement.  A multilateral 
agreement is defined as a treaty, convention, agreement, or protocol that includes at least 
three states.  These different terms are often used interchangeably and may vary 
depending the time period when agreement was drafted, on individual state use, or the 
specific region of the world where the agreement applies.  According the United Nations 
Treaty Reference Guide1, in general “agreements” tend to be less formal or deal with 
narrower subject matters (for example commodity agreements) than “treaties.” 
“Conventions” often involve large numbers of parties (or are open to a large number of 
states) or are negotiated under the auspices of an international organization.  “Protocols” 
include optional protocols to a treaty (additional obligations to a treaty that are 
independent of the treaty), protocols based on framework or umbrella convention 
(common with some environmental treaties), or protocols which amend previous 
treaties2.  While all of these different terms exist, what is important here is that all refer to 
international, legally-binding instruments.           
A signed agreement is an agreement where negotiations have been completed and 
the agreement was adopted and opened for signature.   Cases where negotiations may 
have taken place, but no agreement was ever completed (failed negotiations) are not 
                                                 
1 Available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/guide.asp. 
2 Agreements may also be “amended.”  Many amendments deal with technical changes to the agreement, 
adjusting wording or references, or extending the duration of the agreement.   These amendments are 
excluded from this study, while amendments that make more substantial changes are included.    
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included in the data, however, agreements that were signed but never entered into force 
are included.  The exclusion of negotiations that ended without agreements does lead to a 
selection bias, which will be addressed later.  This selection bias is unavoidable at this 
time, as identifying all the cases of failed negotiations would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible.   
Unfortunately, there is no single, comprehensive list of multilateral agreements in 
existence3.  The United Nations Treaty Series includes a database of a large number of 
multilateral treaties, but excludes agreements prior to 1946, agreements that have not 
been registered with the UN, and agreements that never entered into force.  The difficulty 
in identifying the populations of cases makes it difficult to draw a random sample.  
Therefore, this project took an alternative approach.  Agreements were collected one 
issue area at a time from a number of sources, predominately, but not exclusively, from 
the following: the United Nations Treaty Series, United Nations Status of Multilateral 
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General Database, the Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy Multilaterals Project, the Avalon Project at the Yale School of Law, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross International Humanitarian Law Treaty 
Database, and the IEA Database Project (Mitchell 2003).   For each issue area, all the 
agreements pertaining to that issue area were collected from these sources, and any 
additional agreements related to that issue area that were discovered while researching 
agreements in that issue area were added to the analysis.  Once this process was 
completed for an issue area, a fairly comprehensive list of agreements in that issue area 
existed. 
                                                 
3 There have been attempts to do so, but these have been criticized for excluding agreements. 
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The cases used for this analysis include the negotiations of 170 multilateral 
agreements related to arms control/limitation, the rules of war, terrorism, commodities, 
and the environment (specifically oceans).  A list of the agreements used in this analysis 
can be found in the Appendix4.  There are 37 arms control agreements, 33 rules of war 
agreements, 17 terrorism agreements, 45 commodity agreements, and 36 environmental 
agreements dealing with the oceans/high seas.  The agreements included span from 1864 
(when the first Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field was signed) through 2004.   
Essentially a small case study was completed for each agreement in order to code 
the variables of interest.  Information was collected on the history prior to the 
negotiations, proposals and counter-proposals that were made during the process, what 
states were heavily involved in the negotiations, the number of states involved in the 
negotiations, the forums in which the negotiations took place, whether working groups 
and drafting groups were established to draft the agreement, how long the negotiation 
process took, and how many states signed the agreement.  This research was conducted 
using a variety of sources, including primary sources such as minutes and documentation 
from international conferences and international documents from the United Nations and 
other international organizations.  Historical newspaper accounts, books, journal articles, 
and websites (especially of international organizations) were also used.    
The research collected was then used to code the variables of interest.  Among the 
variables most relevant to this project are: the duration of negotiations, who makes the 
first proposal, and the number of states involved in the negotiations.  Since all three of 
                                                 
4 There are an additional approximately 90 agreements in the sample which are excluded from the analysis 
because of missing data. 
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these variables are unique to this project, the remainder of this chapter discusses the 
coding of each of these variables and provides descriptive statistics on each.  
 
III. The Negotiation Process: The Duration of Negotiations 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, one of the questions concerning 
multilateral agreement negotiations that has yet to be answered is how long negotiations 
last.  We actually know very little about what the length of negotiations of multilateral 
agreements are in general.  It might be fairly well-known that the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations lasted almost eight years or that it took close to two 
decades to negotiate the Chemical Weapons Convention. But exactly how representative 
are these two cases of the hundreds and thousands of international agreements?   Do most 
negotiations last this long, and if not, what is more common?  The 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention took more than 10 years to negotiate.  Efforts to draft the 
International Cocoa Agreement 1972 took close to 16 years (not including previous 
attempts to create an international commodity agreement for cocoa prior to and after 
World War I and after World War II).  Attempts to negotiate the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea included meetings of the UN Seabed Committee from 
1968 through 1970, meetings of a preparatory committee from 1970 through 1973, and 
finally the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which held 11 
sessions (and inter-sessional meetings) from 1973 until the agreement was finalized in 
1982.  On the other hand, the 1937 Nyon Agreement was negotiated and agreed to in just 
four days, all 13 Hague Conventions of 1907 were negotiated in just under four months, 
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and the negotiations for the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation lasted for a little less than a year. 
This project will allow us to answer how long the negotiations over multilateral 
agreements are on average.  The variable length of negotiations is measured as the 
number of days from the date of the first proposal until the date of signature.  The date of 
the first proposal is defined as the date when the first written draft is proposed.  The 
reasoning behind this is that it is not until an actual draft proposal has been presented that 
the negotiating parties have something over which to bargain.  This is not to say that 
there may not have been previous discussions or even conferences concerning the issue at 
stake.  But this “pre-negotiation bargaining” is often used for gaining information: the 
issues are reviewed, states attempt to learn the positions of the other states on the issue, 
and states poster for their position.  The actual negotiations are where offers and counter-
offers are made.  This definition differentiates between talk and posturing over an issue 
and bargaining over what the agreement will actually say.  The date of signature is the 
date that the agreement is adopted and opened for signature.    
Summary statistics for the length of negotiations included in this analysis are 
presented in Table 1.  For the whole sample, on average, the length of negotiations for the 
agreements included in this dataset took approximately 900 days (or 2.47 years).  Of 
course, as can be noted from the standard deviation and from the examples given earlier, 
there is quite a large amount of variation here.  Of the agreements included, the shortest 
duration was only four days while the longest was almost 7,600 days (almost 21 years).  
The mean durations are also provided by issue area.  The arms limitation and 
environmental agreements take the longest on average with mean durations of over 1100 
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days (or over three years).  The mean durations for the terrorism, commodity, and rules of 
war agreements are closer to 2 years (the mean duration for the negotiation of rules of 
war agreements being the shortest).   
The large variation in the lengths of multilateral negotiations leads to the question 
of what accounts for this variation.  Why do some multilateral agreements take so much 
longer to negotiate than others?  Work that follows from this project discusses     
theoretical explanations for bargaining duration and then empirically tests these 
theoretical claims.   
 
IV. The Negotiation Process: Who Makes the First Proposal 
The second variable of interest is who makes the first proposal in the bargaining 
process.  The question of who makes the first proposal is an important one.  It can be 
argued that who submits the first proposal plays an important role in the negotiation 
process, as they are setting the agenda for the bargaining process.  Counterproposals will 
be made in response to the initial proposal on the table.  Who makes the first proposal 
may indicate a certain level of involvement and possibly influence over the negotiation 
process by that actor.  In addition, it may be costly to invest time and energy into 
preparing the first proposal.  So who chooses to bear this cost may be of interest.  But 
outside of a few case studies and some anecdotal evidence, it is not clear who assumes 
this role during the negotiations of multilateral agreements.  Are initial proposals made 
by a single state or jointly by a group of states?  Are they made by major powers?  Or are 
they made by non-state actors such as a non-governmental organization or the 
bureaucrats of inter-governmental organizations?   
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A common assumption is that states, especially powerful states, make the first 
proposal in the bargaining process. There is no major consensus in the cooperation 
literature as far as who the major actors in the agreement making process are.  
Traditionally states have been the central focus of international relations.  When it comes 
to international negotiations, many would assume that it is states making most of the 
proposals, since it is states that have the voting power over which proposals are accepted, 
it is states that must sign and ratify the final agreement, and it is the behavior of states 
which the agreements will regulate.   
 To some scholars, it is not just any state that is the major actor in international 
relations, but the more powerful ones.  Powerful states yield the most influence on 
international cooperation.  According to hegemonic stability theory, the structure of the 
international system is hierarchical and the dominant state, or hegemon, determines the 
rules and norms and enforces them on the other states (Kindleberger 1973 and 1981, 
Keohane and Nye 1977, Gilpin 1981).  Order is created by a single dominant power and 
since regimes constitute elements of the international order, a hegemon is necessary for 
the formation of international regimes (Keohane 1980).  There are two different methods 
by which the hegemon can influence cooperation: a more benevolent version in which the 
hegemon shoulders the burden of establishing regimes (Kindleberger 1973 and 1981) or a 
more self-interested and coercive version in which the hegemon establishes the order it 
prefers by altering the payoffs of cooperation and non-cooperation (Krasner 1976, Gilpin 
1981).  The hegemon can be conducive to cooperation at the bargaining stage by 
imposing the agenda and coercing others to accept its agenda.  However, as Keohane 
(1984) argues “there is little reason to believe that hegemony is either a necessary or a 
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sufficient condition for the emergence of cooperative relationships” (31).  Keohane also 
argues that there is little empirical support for the presence of a hegemonic leader for the 
continuation of cooperation.  Snidal (1985b) argues that hegemonic stability theory is 
limited to special conditions that are only present is some international issue areas. 
The position of states as the only players in international relations is not as clear-
cut as it once was.  With the growth in the number of inter-governmental organizations 
(IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) during the 20th century, the 
presence of and the possible influence of these non-state actors in international relations 
has been noted.  Their presence is particular noticeable in international cooperation and 
the agreement making process.  As Koremenos et al (2001) note, “although in most 
arrangements negotiators are typically states, this is not part of our definition; it is an 
empirical observation that may vary across issues and over time.  In fact non-state actors 
participate with increasing frequency in institutional design” (763).   
Inter-governmental organizations have been noted in the literature as forums in 
which international bargaining takes place (Morrow 1994, Fearon 1998).  Others have 
noted that IGOs can carry out much more than just supportive functions.  Abbot and 
Snidal (1998) focus on some of the more active functions of these organizations that are 
made possible because of the specialized committees staffed by the secretariats.  They 
note how IGOs can initiate work by convening member states to consider current 
problems, structuring the negotiation agendas, and advancing “specific proposals and 
suggesting linkages and tradeoffs” (Abbot and Snidal 1998, 17).  To counter arguments 
that IGOs are just reflections of the preferences of member states, Barnett and Finnemore 
(1999) argue that because of the legitimacy of the “rational legal authority” they embody 
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and their control over technical expertise and information, which creates informational 
asymmetries between these organizations and states, these international organizations 
have “power independent of the states that created them…” (699).  Therefore, IGOs 
should be treated as agents, not just structure.  They note that while IGOs may be 
constrained by states, “the notion that they are passive mechanisms with no independent 
agenda of their own is not borne out by any detailed empirical study of an IO that we 
have found,” citing such examples as the European Union, the World Bank, and the UN 
High Commission for Refugees (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 705).  Rather Barnett and 
Finnemore find evidence of IGOs successfully promoting policies that were not 
necessarily promoted by strong states. 
The role of NGOs in international relations has also been noted, although with 
little consensus as to just what this role is.  At the extremes are, on one end former UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1996) calling NGOs full participants on the 
international stage, and at the other those who claim that NGOs have no effect on the 
state-controlled nature of international negotiation.  There are certainly empirical 
examples of NGO participation in negotiations and the number of NGOs taking part in 
international negotiations is large and growing.  For example, Lisowski (2005) notes that 
over 10,000 NGOs attended the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development 
and have since played a significant role in an increasing number of multilateral 
environmental negotiations.  NGOs may take part in agenda setting and participate 
directly in the formulation of international agreements, although their participation in the 
process “remains largely unofficial, ad hoc, or subject to their preferences of national 
governments” (Albin 1999, 371).  But there are cases where “accredited NGOs are 
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welcome to distribute documents, meet face-to-face with negotiators, and attend most 
formal and informal negotiating sessions” (Lisowski 2005, 364).  The extent to which 
NGOs have access to and influence over negotiations depends on such factors as the rules 
and procedures regarding participation, the nature of the issue to be negotiated, and the 
extent to which NGOs are perceived as able to effectively contribute to the discussion 
(Albin 1999).  Albin notes that the participation of NGOs in international negotiations 
can range from assistance with the preparation of background documents to making oral 
presentations to formulating draft proposals and agreements.           
As can be seen, there are rather divergent views concerning the roles that states 
and non-states actors play in international negotiations.  On the empirical side, there are 
examples of the role that IGOs and NGOs have played in negotiations processes and of 
the influence that IGOs and NGOs have had during some international negotiations.  But 
from these anecdotal examples it is not clear how prevalent the participation of these non-
states actors actually is.  By analyzing who makes the first proposal, we can begin to 
answer questions concerning the role played by these actors at one stage of the agreement 
making process.  In general, who makes the first proposal in multilateral agreement 
making process across a large range of international negotiations?     
We can answer this question by analyzing the data on who makes the first 
proposal in the negotiation processes for the 170 cases included in this study.  The 
variable of interest here is who makes the first proposal in the bargaining process.  The 
first proposal is defined as the very first written draft proposal submitted5.  This is the 
same proposal that is used to mark the start of negotiations for the measure of the length 
                                                 
5 This does not mean that the proposal must be submitted to a formal negotiating conference.  But it does 
mean that the draft must be presented to parties involved in the negotiations. 
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of negotiations.  Who submits this first written draft makes the first proposal in the 
negotiation process.  Drafts proposed in the negotiation process may be written by states, 
inter-governmental organizations, and/or non-governmental organizations.  When the 
first proposal is made by an individual state, the variable single state proposer is coded as 
one and coded as zero otherwise.  There is also the case that the first proposal may be 
made jointly by a group of states.  In these cases where more than one country submits a 
single draft, the variable joint state proposer is coded as one and coded as zero 
otherwise6.     
In order to determine whether or not it is major powers leading the way in 
negotiations, we are not only interested in whether a state makes the first proposal but 
also whether a major power was involved in proposing the first draft.  Therefore, a 
separate variable major power proposer is coded as one when the first proposal is made 
by a major power and coded as zero otherwise.  It is important to note that a major power 
proposer is coded as one both when a single major power makes the first proposal and 
when a major power is part of a joint state proposal.  States are classified as major powers 
according to the Correlates of War Project (2003).         
When the first draft is not proposed by an individual state or by a group of states, 
it was proposed by a non-state actor.  Since there are multiple definitions and 
interpretations of what inter-governmental organizations and international non-
governmental organizations are, clarification of their meanings is necessary before 
proceeding to an analysis of their roles.  In general, inter-governmental organizations 
                                                 
6 In addition to the cases where more than one state makes the first proposal, cases where either NATO or 
Warsaw Pact countries made the first proposal are coded as joint proposals.  When the EEC makes the first 
proposal, this is also coded as a joint proposal. 
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refer to institutions composed of the governments of member states.  The Yearbook of 
International Organizations defines an inter-governmental organization according to 
three criteria: 1) being based on a formal international agreement between the 
governments of states, 2) including three or more states as parties to the agreement, and 
3) possessing a permanent secretariat performing ongoing tasks (Union of International 
Organizations).  The definition for non-governmental organizations is less 
straightforward as there is no generally accepted definition of NGOs or a general 
consensus as to what is included as an NGO.  According to a UN Economic and Social 
Council resolution “any international organization which is not established by the 
intergovernmental agreement shall be considered as a non-governmental organization.7”  
This definition does not distinguish between non-profit groups and profit corporations, 
although it may not be hard to imagine that many international cooperation scholars have 
the former and not the latter in mind.  
If the first proposal is made by an inter-governmental organization (such as when 
the first draft is prepared by a UN working group), the variable IGO proposer is coded as 
one and coded as zero otherwise.  Examples of IGOs that have made the first proposal in 
negotiations include the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, the 
International Coffee Organization, and the UN International Law Commission, as well as 
working groups, groups of experts or drafting committees established by IGOs, such as 
the Inter-governmental Working Group on Marine Pollution or the Cocoa Study Group of 
the Food and Agricultural Organization.  
                                                 
7 UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 288 (X) of 27 February 1950. 
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If the first proposal is made by an NGO, the variable NGO proposer is coded as 
one and coded as zero otherwise.  Examples of NGOs that have prepared and proposed 
the first draft in negotiations include such well-known ones as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and Greenpeace International.  NGO proposer is also coded 
as one in the rare case when the proposal is drafted by an individual person, since the 
individual often represents a group with a common interest, even if a formal NGO has not 
yet been established8.  Finally, is a few cases, the first proposer is also coded as an NGO 
when the first draft was proposed by a groups that would not ordinarily come to mind 
when thinking of NGOs, such as the Rubber Grower’s Association, which represented the 
Anglo-Dutch rubber industry in the 1930’s, not governments. 
Finally, there is one case that has yet to be discussed – when  more than one first 
proposal is made simultaneously.  This is different than a joint state proposal in that more 
than one state is making the first proposal, each submitting its own draft proposal.  The 
variable multiple first proposals is coded as one when more than one proposal is 
submitted for the first draft at the start of negotiations (on the same day) and coded as 
zero otherwise.  In these cases, there is more than one draft on the table when 
negotiations begin.  However, when there are multiple first proposals the proposer is still 
coded according to its type.  That is, for each proposal, single state proposer, joint state 
proposer, IGO proposer, and NGO proposer are coded accordingly, and if one of the 
proposals came from a major power, this is also coded as such9.   
                                                 
8 An example of this in the sample is the 1935 Roerich Pact (the Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and 
Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments), which recognizes historic monuments, museums, etc. as 
neutral and to be protected in time of war by belligerents.  The initial proposal was written by Georges 
Chklaver of the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales of the University of Paris, but even this was done 
at the request of the Roerich Museum in New York. 
9 For example, if simultaneous first proposals were made by two states presenting individual drafts and at 
least one of those states was a major power, then single state proposer, major power proposer and multiple 
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Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.  As can be seen from the table, not 
all proposals are made by states.  While 59% of the first proposals were made by states 
(45% by a single state and 14% in the form of a joint proposal), non-state actors have 
provided there own fair share of first drafts.  IGOs and NGOs made the first proposal for 
35% and 9% of the agreements, respectively.  The first proposal was made by a major 
power in 36% of the cases, meaning that in approximately two-thirds of the cases where 
the first draft was proposed by a state or a group of states, a major power was involved.  
But what is most interesting is that the number of cases in which the first proposal was 
made by a major power is the same as the number of cases where the first proposal was 
made by an IGO.   
One other interesting question is whether or not there is variation in who makes 
the first proposal across issue areas.  Are IGOs and NGOs more likely to make the first 
proposal in some issue areas as compared to others?   Are major powers more 
predominant in some certain issue areas than others?  Descriptive statistics for first 
proposals according to issue area are presented in Table 3.  There are a number of 
interesting findings concerning variation across issue area.  First, within the category of 
arms agreements, a very large majority of the agreements (82%) had first proposals made 
by states, which were predominately major powers.  In fact, 66% of the arms agreements 
had first drafts proposed by major powers.  Likewise, for the rules of war agreements, 
states continued to play a large role in proposing the first drafts, with a large percentage 
of these proposals being made by major powers.  However, the role of non-state actors is 
                                                                                                                                                 
first proposals are all coded as one, while the other variables are coded as zero.   Or if an IGO and a major 
power simultaneously made the first proposal, then IGO proposer, single states proposer, major power 
proposer, and multiple first proposals are all coded as one, while the other variables are coded as zero.   
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also important here, as the number of drafts originating with IGOs and NGOs combined 
accounted for just as many first proposals as those originating with states.  (Rules are war 
is also interesting as the number agreements where multiple first proposals occurred is 
largest in this category, with this occurring in close to a fifth of the cases). 
As we move into the other categories, the increase in the number of agreements 
having first drafts proposed by IGOs is noticeable.  Forty percent of the commodity 
agreements have first proposals drafted by an IGO.  And within the environmental 
agreements, IGOs play a predominate role – making the first proposals for over 60% of 
the agreements, compared to only 37% for states.  It is also important to note that while 
the number of agreements where the first proposal is drafted by a major power decreases 
as we move away from the arms and rules of war agreements, the proportion of the 
proposals by states that involve major powers still remains high.  For example, while only 
37% of the environmental agreements have first proposals made by states, 59% of these 
involve a major power.   
As with the duration of negotiations, there is also quite a bit of variation in who 
submits the first proposal.  This variation leads to the question of how who makes the 
first proposal may affect the negotiation process.  Additional work analyzes how who 
makes the first proposal may have an effect on the length of negotiation and the final 
agreement that is obtained from negotiations.   
 
V. The Negotiation Process: The Number of States 
The third variable is the number of states that take part in negotiations.  Collecting 
data on the number of states involved in the negotiation process can be complicated: in 
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many cases there are a number of different rounds of bargaining leading to an agreement, 
and the number of states can vary with each round.  In addition, the bargaining that leads 
to an individual agreement can take place in various forums: consultations among a small 
group of states, ad hoc committees, small working or drafting groups, large-scale 
international conferences (and multiple sessions of an international conference).  For 
these reasons, any one agreement can have multiple counts for the number of parties that 
took part in negotiations.  For the purposes here, the variable negotiating states is coded 
as the maximum number of states that took part in negotiations at any one point.  In other 
words, for a hypothetical agreement, if negotiations consisted of a working group of 9 
countries, a preparatory meeting attended by representatives of 25 countries, and 
international conference of 48 countries, then negotiating states would be coded as 48.  
Such a coding mechanism is the most appropriate for purposes for which this variable 
will be used10. 
Descriptive statistics for the number of negotiating states are presented in Table 4.  
The mean number of states that take part in the negotiations of the multilateral 
agreements included in this analysis is approximately 52 states.  As with some of the 
other variables, there is variation here with the smallest number of states being 4 and the 
largest being 191.  The differences in the number of negotiating states by issue area are 
not too drastic.  The one big exception is the large number of states that take part in 
terrorism agreement negotiations: the mean number of states is almost 83.  The number 
of states partaking in the negotiations of commodity and environmental agreements is 
                                                 
10 In most cases, we are interested in how the more states involved, the more complicated negotiations may 
be or the more difficult it will be to reach consensus.  We are also interested in whether more the states 
involved in negotiations, the less likely parties will to create an agreement that requires deeper cooperative 
policies of states.  
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slightly smaller than the other issue areas.  The maximum number of negotiating states is 
the smallest for commodity agreements at 124. 
The implications of the number of states that take part in negotiations such as the 
effect on the length of negotiations and the depth of the final agreement are addressed in 
other work.  One key point is that the number of parties taking part in negotiations is not 
exogenous: a select group of states can decide to bargain over a multilateral agreement 
among themselves, excluding most countries from the process.  On the hand, negotiations 
may be open to anyone and everyone, but states still decide whether to take part in 
negotiations or not.      
 
VI. Conclusions and Future Research 
Using the above variables, we were able to answer some major questions about 
the negotiation process in general.  Based on the agreements included in this analysis, we 
were able to answer how long the negotiations of these agreements lasted on average, 
whether a state or non-state actor submitted the first proposal, and how many states 
participated in these negotiations on average.  The findings on who makes the first 
proposal offer more than just anecdotal evidence that non-state actors do indeed play this 
role during negotiations.  IGOs and NGOs do participate directly in the formulation of 
international agreements, perhaps even setting the agenda for the negotiation process.   
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The data created as part of this research11 has been used and will continue to be 
used to test empirical claims from the literature, many of which have not been subjected 
to rigorous systematic testing yet.  First, explanations for the duration of the negotiations 
of international agreement are tested in order to answer why some agreements take just a 
few days or weeks to negotiate while others take years.  Among the possible explanations 
analyzed are the number of negotiating parties, the involvement of IGOs and NGOs in 
the negotiation process, and the length of the shadow of the future.  Second, the effect 
who makes the first proposal, thereby initiating negotiations, may have on the extent of 
cooperation obtained by the final agreement is examined.  In particular, the focus is on 
how who makes the first proposal may affect both the breadth (membership) and depth of 
the agreement.  Third, the data is also used to examine the existence of a broader-deeper 
tradeoff for the agreements included in the dataset. 
This research has allowed for the identification of a number of different ways in 
which agreements are negotiated.  Sometimes a small number of powerful states 
negotiate among themselves, in which case other states may then be invited to sign onto 
an already finished agreement.  Sometimes an IGO will establish a working group of 
                                                 
11 The dataset consists of a number of additional variables.  Briefly, there are a number of variables 
collected from the agreement text.  First, a brief list of what some of the major provisions included in the 
agreement was recorded.  This was used to code whether the agreement contains multiple provisions (i.e. 
addresses more than one policy), whether the agreement sets a single policy level for all members or 
whether different policy levels are set for different members, and what the depth of cooperation required by 
the agreement is.  In addition, whether the text of the agreement contains a duration limit for the agreement 
is coded.  Finally, each agreement’s requirements for entry into force are obtained from the treaty text.  
This includes the number of states required to ratify the agreement in order for the agreement to enter into 
force and whether or not the agreement requires specific states that must ratify the agreement in order for it 
to enter into force.  Second, there are a number of variables in the dataset related to membership to the 
agreement.  This includes the number of original signatories to the agreement, the number of current 
signatories and ratifications to the agreement, and which states may sign and/or accede to the agreement.  
Finally, the dataset includes if and when the agreement entered into force (from which the length of time 
that the agreement took to enter into force can be calculated) and whether the agreement is still in force or 
if it has expired or has been replaced by a new agreement. 
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experts that will meet to draft an agreement.  Usually these working groups will be 
composed of representatives and experts from a number of interested governments.  
Sometimes the bureaucrats working within an IGO will introduce the first working draft.  
Sometimes a large international conference is convened to address a problem.  These 
conferences may operate by consensus, or they may operate by majority rule.  What is 
clear from this research is that there is no single process for negotiating multilateral 
agreements, but there are patterns in common among various negotiations.  Classifying 
negotiations according to these patterns would capture more about what occurs during the 
negotiation process and lead to better analysis.  In addition, the variation in negotiation 
processes leads to a number of interesting questions.  All of the negotiations are meant to 
solve cooperation problems, yet states have different ways of going about this.  Why do 
some negotiations follow one pattern and others proceed in another?  For example, are 
certain types of cooperative problems better addressed one way over another?  Also, there 
is obviously a great amount of variation concerning who makes the first proposal during 
negotiations.  What accounts for this?  What factors either encourage or discourage a 
state from doing so?  What factors determine whether an IGO or NGO will take this 
initiative?     
     This project and the dataset are not without their problems.  One of the biggest 
causes of concern is the selection bias faced because the data does not include agreements 
that were never created.  This is problematic since the approach of this project is that 
multilateral agreements are endogenous.  What occurs during the course of negotiations 
of agreements that never culminate in a completed agreement has just as much to say 
about the interactions and bargaining among states as the negotiations that do reach an 
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agreement.  Ignoring these negotiations leaves one to wonder what caused their failure 
and what extent of cooperation could have been obtained had the negotiations reached 
agreement.  As mentioned earlier, this selection bias in unavoidable at this time; 
identifying all of the cases of failed negotiations would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible.  The alternative would be to not analyze multilateral agreements and the 
negotiations of multilateral agreements at all.  But this would ignore a great wealth of 
understanding concerning interactions and cooperation among states.  Even with this 
selection bias, we can still learn much from the large amount of agreements that are 
negotiated and what factors may aid or impede this process.  And with time, it may be 
possible to identify more and more cases of failed negotiations.             
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Appendix: List of Multilateral Agreements 
 
Title Signature Date 
Entry Into 
Force 
   
Arms Limitation and Rules of War Agreements   
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in 
Armies in the Field (1865) 22 Aug 1864 22 Jun 1865 
Conference of Brussels of 1874 27 Aug 1874 - 
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in time of War, of Certain Explosive 
Projectiles (St. Petersburg Conference) 11 Dec 1868 11 Dec 1868 
Declaration I Concerning Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from 
Balloons 29 Jul 1899 4 Sep 1900 
Declaration II Concerning Asphyxiating Gases 29 Jul 1899 4 Sep 1900 
Declaration III Concerning Expanding Bullets 29 Jul 1899 4 Sep 1900 
Convention I for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes  29 Jul 1899 4 Sep 1900 
Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land  29 Jul 1899 4 Sep 1900 
Convention III for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles 
of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864 29 Jul 1899 4 Sep 1900 
Convention VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine 
Contact Mines  18 Oct 1907 26 Jan 1910 
Declaration Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives 
from Balloons 18 Oct 1907 27 Nov 1909 
Convention I for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes  18 Oct 1907 26 Jan 1910 
Convention II The Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of 
Contract Debts 18 Oct 1907 26 Jan 1910 
Convention III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities  18 Oct 1907 26 Jan 1910 
Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 18 Oct 1907 26 Jan 1910 
Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and 
Persons in Case of War on Land  18 Oct 1907 26 Jan 1910 
Convention VI Relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the 
Outbreak of Hostilities  18 Oct 1907 26 Jan 1910 
Convention VII Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-
Ships  18 Oct 1907 26 Jan 1910 
Convention IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of 
War  18 Oct 1907 26 Jan 1910 
Convention X for the Adaptation to Maritime War of the Principles of 
the Geneva Convention  18 Oct 1907 26 Jan 1910 
Convention XI Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the 
Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War  18 Oct 1907 26 Jan 1910 
Convention XII Relative to the Creation of an International Prize Court 18 Oct 1907 - 
Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers 
in Naval War  18 Oct 1907 26 Jan 1910 
Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in 
Warfare 6 Feb 1922 - 
Washington Naval Limitations Treaty  (Five Power Naval Treaty) 6 Feb 1922 17 Aug 1923 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare  17 Jun 1925 8 Feb 1928 
Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments (London 
Naval Treaty) 22 Apr 1930 31 Dec 1930 
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Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and 
Historic Monuments (Roerich Pact) 15 Aug 1935 26 Aug 1935 
Second London Naval Treaty 25 Mar 1936 29 Jul 1937 
The Nyon Agreement 14 Sep 1937 14 Sep 1937 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal (The London Agreement) 
8 Aug 1945 8 Aug 1945 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide  9 Dec 1948 12 Jan 1951 
Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 12 Aug 1949 21 Oct 1950 
Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea  12 Aug 1949 21 Oct 1950 
Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War  12 Aug 1949 21 Oct 1950 
Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War  12 Aug 1949 21 Oct 1950 
Convention and Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict  14 May 1954 7 Aug 1956 
The Antarctic Treaty 1 Dec 1959 23 Jun 1961 
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer 
Space and Under Water (The Limited Test Ban Treaty) 5 Aug 1963 10 Oct 1963 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (The Outer Space Treaty) 
27 Jan 1967 10 Oct 1967 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty 
of Tlatelolco) 14 Feb 1967 25 Apr 1969 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty - NPT) 1 Jul 1968 5 Mar 1970 
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons 
and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the 
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof  (SEABED Treaty) 
11 Feb 1971 18 May 1972 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
their Destruction  (The Biological Weapons Convention) 
10 Apr 1972 26 Mar 1975 
Helsinki Final Act 1 Aug 1975 1 Aug 1975 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) 10 Dec 1976 5 Oct 1978 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflict 
Geneva Conventions Protocol I 
8 Jun 1977 7 Dec 1978 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed 
conflict  
8 Jun 1977 7 Dec 1978 
Convention of the OAU for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa 3 Jul 1977 22 Apr 1985 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be excessively 
injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (CONVENTION ON 
CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCCW)) 
10 Oct 1980 2 Dec 1983 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Protocol I on Non-
Detectable Fragments 10 Oct 1980 2 Dec 1983 
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Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Protocol II on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices 
10 Oct 1980 2 Dec 1983 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Protocol III on 
Prohibitions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons 10 Oct 1980 2 Dec 1983 
 
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)  
6 Aug 1985 11 Dec 1986 
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries 4 Dec 1989 20 Oct 2001 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) 19 Nov 1990 9 Nov 1992 
Treaty on Open Skies    24 Mar 1992 1 Jan 2002 
Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE 1A) 10 Jul 1992 9 Nov 1992 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 
(Chemical Weapons Convention - CWC) 
13 Jan 1993 29 Apr 1997 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Protocol IV on Blinding 
Laser Weapons 13 Oct 1995 30 Jul 1998 
Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 
(SEANWFZ) (Bangkok Treaty) 15 Dec 1995 28 Mar 1997 
The African Nuclear-Weapon -Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) 11 Apr 1996 - 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II  3 May 1996 3 Dec 1998 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty  10 Sep 1996 - 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Mine Ban 
Treaty) 
18 Sep 1997 1 Mar 1999 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 17 Jul 1998 1 Jul 2002 
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 26 Mar 1999 9 Mar 2004 
Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe  19 Nov 1999 - 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict 25 May 2000 12 Feb 2002 
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal 
Court  9 Sep 2002 22 Jul 2004 
   
Commodity Agreements   
Agreement on the International Tin Control Scheme of 1931 28 Feb 1931 1 Mar 1931 
London Silver Agreement 22 Jul 1933 24 Apr 1934 
International Wheat Agreement of 1933 25 Aug 1933 25 Aug 1933 
International Rubber Regulation Agreement of 1934 7 May 1934 1 Jun 1934 
European Timber Exporters Convention 15 Nov 1935 1 Dec 1935 
International Sugar Agreement, 1937 (Agreement Concerning the 
Regulation of Production and Marketing of Sugar) 6 May 1937 1 Sep 1937 
Inter-American Coffee Agreement 28 Nov 1940 16 Apr 1941 
Interim International Wheat Agreement 22 Apr 1942 27 Jun 1942 
International Wheat Agreement of 1948 6 Mar 1948 - 
International Wheat Agreement of 1949 23 Mar 1949 1 Jul 1949 
International Sugar Agreement, 1953 1 Oct 1953 15 Dec 1953 
International Tin Agreement (1954) 9 Dec 1953 1 Jul 1956 
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International Agreement on Olive Oil,1956 17 Oct 1955 - 
International Wheat Agreement of 1956 25 Apr 1956 1 Aug 1956 
Mexico City Agreement (Agreement of Mexico) 18 Oct 1957 18 Oct 1957 
Latin American Coffee Agreement (The Washington Agreement) 27 Sep 1958 1 Oct 1958 
International Coffee Agreement, 1959 24 Sep 1959 1 Oct 1959 
International Coffee Agreement, 1962 28 Sep 1962 1 Jul 1963 
Third International Tin Agreement (1965) 1 Jun 1965 1 Jul 1966 
International Grains Arrangement, 1967: (a) Wheat Trade Convention 15 Oct 1967 18 Jun 1968 
International Grains Arrangement, 1967: (b) Food Aid Convention 15 Oct 1967 1 Jul 1968 
International Coffee Agreement, 1968 18 Mar 1968 1 Oct 1968 
International Sugar Agreement, 1968 3 Dec 1968 1 Jan 1969 
International Cocoa Agreement, 1972 21 Oct 1972 30 Jun 1973 
International Sugar Agreement, 1973  13 Oct 1973 1 Jan 1974 
International Coffee Agreement, 1976 3 Dec 1975 1 Oct 1976 
International Natural Rubber Agreement on Price Stabilisation 30 Nov 1976 29 Nov 1977 
International Sugar Agreement, 1977 7 Oct 1977 1 Jan 1978 
International Natural Rubber Agreement, 1979 6 Oct 1979 23 Oct 1980 
Agreement establishing the Common Fund for Commodities 27 Jun 1980 19 Jun 1989 
International Cocoa Agreement, 1980 19 Nov 1980 1 Aug 1981 
International Coffee Agreement, 1983 25 Sep 1982 1 Oct 1983 
International Agreement on jute and jute products, 1982 1 Oct 1982 9 Jan 1984 
Agreement establishing the Association of Tin Producing Countries 29 Mar 1983 16 Aug 1983 
International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1983 18 Nov 1983 1 Apr 1985 
International Sugar Agreement, 1984 5 Jul 1984 1 Jan 1985 
International Cocoa Agreement, 1986 25 Jul 1986 20 Jan 1987 
International Natural Rubber Agreement, 1987 20 Mar 1987 29 Dec 1988 
International Sugar Agreement, 1987 11 Sep 1987 24 Mar 1988 
International Agreement on Jute and Jute Products, 1989 3 Nov 1989 12 Apr 1991 
International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994 26 Jan 1994 1 Jan 1997 
International Coffee Agreement, 1994 30 Mar 1994 1 Oct 1994 
International Natural Rubber Agreement, 1994 17 Feb 1995 14 Feb 1997 
International Cocoa Agreement, 2001 2 Mar 2001 1 Oct 2003 
Agreement establishing the Terms of Reference of the International 
Jute Study Group, 2001 13 Mar 2001 27 Apr 2002 
   
Environmental Agreements   
Convention between the United States, Great Britain, Russia and 
Japan for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals[i] 7 Jul 1911 15 Dec 1911 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by 
Oil (OILPOL) 12 May 1954 26 July 1958 
Convention on Fishing & Conservation of Living Resources of the High 
Seas  29 Apr 1958 20 Mar 1966 
Convention on the Continental Shelf  29 Apr 1958 10 Jun 1964 
Convention on the High Seas  29 Apr 1958 30 Sep 1962 
Convention on the Territorial Sea & the Contiguous Zone  29 Apr 1958 10 Sep 1964 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by 
Oil, 1954, as amended in 1962 11 Apr 1962 18 May 1967 
Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea  12 Sep 1964 22 Jul 1968 
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International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in 
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (1969 Brussels Public Law 
Convention) 
29 Nov 1969 6 May 1975 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
(1969 Private Law Convention)/ (Civil Liability Convention-CLC)   29 Nov 1969 19 Jun 1975 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund 
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage  18 Dec 1971 16 Oct 1978 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matters (London Dumping Convention/London 
Convention) 
29 Dec 1972 30 Aug 1975 
Protocol to the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the 
High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 2 Nov 1973 30 Mar 1983 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL) 2 Nov 1973 2 Oct 1983 
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic 
Sea Area (Helsinki Convention) 22 Mar 1974 3 May 1980 
Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against 
Pollution and Protocols (Barcelona Convention) 16 Feb 1976 12 Feb 1978 
Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as Amended (MARPOL 
73/78) 
17 Feb 1978 2 Oct 1983 
Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-Operation on the Protection of the 
Marine environment from Pollution and Protocol 24 Apr 1978 1 July 1979 
Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution 
from Land-Based Sources (LBS Protocol) 17 May 1980 17 Jun 1983 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources  20 May 1980 7 Apr 1982 
Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of 
Aden Environment and Protocol (Jeddah Convention) 14 Feb 1982 20 Aug 1985 
Protocol Concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas (SPA 
Protocol) 3 Apr 1982 23 Jun 1986 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  10 Dec 1982 16 Nov 1994 
Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the 
Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region 
(Nairobi Convention) 
21 Jun 1985 30 May 1996 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response 
and Co-Operation, 1990  (OPRC Convention) 30 Nov 1990 13 May 1995 
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic 
Sea Area with Annexes    9 Apr 1992 17 Jan 2000 
Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution 
Resulting from the Exploration and Exploitations of the Continental 
Shelf and Seabed and its Subsoil (Offshore Protocol) 
14 Oct 1994 - 
Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological 
Diversity in the Mediterranean 10 Jun 1995 12 Dec 1999 
Protocol on the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by 
the Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal (Hazardous Waste Protocol) 
1 Oct 1996 - 
Protocol of 1997 to Amend the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as Modified by the Protocol 
of 1978 Relating Thereto 
26 Sep 1997 19 May 2005 
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Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to pollution 
Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 2000 (OPRC-HNS 
Protocol) 
15 Mar 2000 - 
Framework Agreement for the Conservation of the Living Marine 
Resources of the High Seas of  the South Pacific (Galapagos 
Agreement) 
14 Aug 2000 - 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean  5 Sep 2000 19 Jun 2004 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery 
Resources in the South East Atlantic Ocean 20 Apr 2001 30 Apr 2003 
International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling 
Systems on Ships (AFS Convention) 5 Nov 2001 - 
Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Preventing Pollution from Ships 
And, in Cases of Emergency, Combating Pollution of the 
Mediterranean Sea 
25 Jan 2002 17 Mar 2004 
   
Terrorism Agreements   
Convention of 1937 for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 16 Nov 1937 - 
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft (Tokyo Convention) 14 Sep 1963 4 Dec 1969 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague 
Convention) 16 Dec 1970 14 Oct 1971 
OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism taking 
the form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of 
International Significance  
2 Feb 1971 16 Oct 1973 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention) 23 Sep 1971 26 Jan 1973 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 14 Dec 1973 20 Feb 1977 
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (Extradition 
Act) 27 Jan 1977 4 Aug 1978 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Nuclear 
Materials Convention) 26 Oct 1979 8 Feb 1987 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages 
Convention) 17 Dec 1979 3 June 1983 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation 10 Mar 1988 1 Mar 1992 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 10 Mar 1988 1 Mar 1992 
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Identification  1 Mar 1991 21 Jun 1998 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings  15 Dec 1997 23 May 2001 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism 9 Dec 1999 10 Apr 2002 
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism 3 Jun 2002 10 Jul 2003 
Additional Protocol to the SAARC Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism 6 Jan 2004 12 Jan 2006 
Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 13 Apr 2005 - 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics: Length of Negotiations   
       
Issue Area   N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
All Agreements  168 899.78 1057.41 4 7596 
       
Arms Limitation  37 1120.22 1500.33 4 7596 
       
Rules of War  33 666.45 802.56 14 3260 
       
Terrorism  17 872.24 803.69 128 2997 
       
Commodity  45 705.53 675.06 33 3314 
       
Environmental  36 1142.92 1162.02 16 6269 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics: First Draft Proposal 
No. of Observations 170  
   
Proposal Maker Mean Std. Dev.
Single State 0.45 0.50
Joint State 0.14 0.35
NGO 0.09 0.29
IGO 0.35 0.48
   
Major Power 0.36 0.48
   
Multiple First Proposals 0.09 0.28
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics: First Draft Proposal by Issue Area 
      
  
Arms 
Limitation/ 
restriction 
Rules 
of 
War 
Terrorism Commodity Environmental 
No. of Observations 38 34 17 45 36 
      
Single State 0.66 0.50 0.35 0.38 0.31 
Joint State 0.16 0.03 0.24 0.24 0.06 
NGO 0.11 0.26 0 0.02 0.06 
IGO 0.08 0.26 0.41 0.40 0.61 
      
Major Power 0.66 0.41 0.29 0.20 0.22 
      
Multiple First Proposals 0.08 0.18 0 0.09 0.06 
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics: Negotiating States   
       
Issue Area   N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
All Agreements  168 52.06 39.77 4 191 
       
Arms Limitation  37 48.97 42.81 5 166 
       
Rules of War  33 56.61 37.12 4 159 
       
Terrorism  17 82.71 56.79 7 191 
       
Commodity  45 46.62 27.96 5 124 
       
Environmental  36 43.39 36.64 4 163 
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